Land & Water Law Review
Volume 9

Issue 2

Article 2

1974

Enforcement under the Federal Water Pollution Control Act
Amendments of 1972
Henry W. Ipsen
Jerry W. Raisch

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water

Recommended Citation
Ipsen, Henry W. and Raisch, Jerry W. (1974) "Enforcement under the Federal Water Pollution Control Act
Amendments of 1972," Land & Water Law Review: Vol. 9 : Iss. 2 , pp. 369 - 420.
Available at: https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol9/iss2/2

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Land & Water Law Review by an authorized editor of Law Archive of Wyoming
Scholarship.

Ipsen and Raisch: Enforcement under the Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendme

University of Wyoming
College of Law

LAND AND WATER
LAW REVIEW
VOLUME IX

1974

NUMBER 2

Mr. Ipsen and Mr. Raisch discuss the enforcement options created
by the Federal Water Pollution Control Act. The authors believe that
the successful implementation of the Act is heavily dependent upon
voluntary compliance by the affected industries and municipalities.
This article provides a brief overview of the development of federal
water quality legislation, explains the major elements of the present
Act and critically examines each of the enforcement provisions of
the Act.

ENFORCEMENT UNDER THE
FEDERAL WATER POLLUTION CONTROL
ACT AMENDMENTS OF 1972t
Henry W. Ipsen*
Jerry W. Raisch**
INTRODUCTION

T

II nation's policy for achievement of clean water has
evolved through six legislative enactments since passage
of the initial Water Pollution Control Act in 1948.' The latest
of these enactments, the Federal Water Pollution Control
Act Amendments of 1972,2 became law on October 18, 1972,
Copyright@ 1974 by the University of Wyoming

tThis article was written by the authors in their private capacity. No official support or endorsement by the Environmental Protection Agency or
any other agency of the federal government is intended or should be inferred.
*Chief, Water Enforcement Section, Enforcement Division, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency-Region VIII; B.A. 1966, J.D. 1969, University
of Wisconsin; admitted to Washington State Bar, 1969, Wisconsin Bar,
1971, Colorado Bar 1973.
**Attorney-Adviser, Air and Water Division, U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency-Region VIII; B.S. 1965, Illinois Institute of Technology; M.B.A.
1967, J.D. 1969, University of Colorado; member of Colorado Bar, 1970.
1. 33 U.S.C. § 1155-1175 (1970).
2. 33 U.S.C.
1251-1376 (Supp. 1973).
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when Congress overrode a presidential veto by a vote of 247
to 23 in the House and 52 to 12 in the Senate.'
It is the purpose of this article to discuss and explore
the enforcement options created by the Act. The article
should be of special interest to both dischargers of pollutants
and environmentalists. It is hoped that a more thorough
understanding of the requirements of the Act by dischargers
will result in a greater degree of voluntary compliance.
Further, knowledge of the requirements which the Act places
on dischargers, state pollution control agencies, and the Environmental Protection Agency should be of help to environmentally concerned groups and individuals in seeing that the
goals and purposes of the Act are carried out.
There are two topics which are preliminary to a thorough
discussion of the enforcement options created by the Act.
The first is a brief overview of the development and past
failures of federal water quality legislation. The second topic
is an explication of the major provisions of the Act which
are subject to enforcement action. Without a basic grasp of
these provisions, the reader will not achieve a thorough understanding of the enforcement options.
HISTORY OF STATUTORY EFFORTS

The Federal Water Pollution Control Act was initially
enacted in 1948 on a temporary basis and extended in 1952.'
The 1948 Act recognized the primary rights and responsibilities of the states to control water pollution,' a congressional policy which is still reflected in the present law. The
initial Act provided for comprehensive water pollution control programs, research, financial assistance to states, municipalities, and interstate agencies for waste treatment facilities.6 Also included was a program for construction loans
and preliminary planning grants that was never implemented
8. House Debate on Overriding the President's Veto of S. 2770, October 18,
1972. Senate Debate on Overriding the President's Veto of S. 2770, October
17, 1972. As reported in, Committe on Public Works, 93d Cong., 1st Sess.,
A Legislative History of the Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of
1972, at 109 and 135 (Comm. Print 1978).
4. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1159-1160 (1970).
5. See enacting clause 88 U.S.C. §§ 1155-1175 (1970).
6. 33 U.S.C. § 1152 (1970).
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because funds were not appropriated.' The pollution of interstate waters which endangered the health or welfare of
persons in a state other than that in which the discharge
originated was declared to be a public nuisance, subject to
abatement Abatement procedures provided for federal court
suits after two notifications were given to the discharger
and the state in which the discharge occurred.' If no remedial
action was taken by the discharger or the state, the Act required that a public hearing be held. Only after the discharger was given a "reasonable" opportunity to comply
with the recommendations resulting from the hearing could
suit be filed. In addition, the Act required that the state in
which the discharge originated consent to the suit. That these
enforcement procedures were cumbersome and ineffectual
is evidenced by the fact that only one hearing was held, and
no suits were ever taken to court under the 1948 Act.
Amendments passed in 1956 authorized federal grants
for construction of waste treatment works, as well as for
establishment and maintenance of state water pollution control programs."0 They also established a three-step enforcement procedure in the case of interstate pollution of interstate waters endangering the health or welfare of persons."
The first step was a federal-state enforcement conference,
with participation by local officials and other interested
persons, to discuss the pollution problem. If the conference
was not successful, a public hearing followed. The conference
could be called either at state request where interstate or intrastate pollution was involved, or initiated by the federal
government where interstate pollution was concerned. The
conferees convened to review the existing situation and any
progress made, to lay a basis for future action and to give
states, local governments, and industries an opportunity to
take any appropriate remedial action pursuant to state or
local law.
In 1961, enforcement authority was extended to navigable, as well as interstate, waters and was applied in cases
7.
8.
9.
10.
it.

33 U.S.C. § 1155 (1970).
33 U.S.C. § 1152(d) (1970).vo.
33 U.S.C. § 1152(d) (1970).
83 U.S.C. §§ 1160 and 1151 (1970).
P.L. 84-660, § 8, 70 STAT. 504 (1956).
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of intrastate pollution on request of the governor of a state.'"
The term "interstate waters" was redefined to include coastal
waters. These changes greatly expanded the subject matter
jurisdiction of the law. In addition, the authorization for
grants, both for construction of waste treatment works and
for state water pollution control programs, was increased
and extended.
The 1965 law provided for the establishment, revision
and enforcement of water quality standards for the nation's
interstate waters."2 This represented a new approach to
water pollution control. The public nuisance concept of prior
legislation was abandoned. The standards consisting of water
quality criteria were designed to provide water of proper
quality for a range of designated uses. A plan for implementation and enforcement was to be prepared in conjunction
with the standards. The states were given the first opportunity to adopt standards subject to federal approval. If a
state failed to do so, the federal government set the standards.
Any discharge which reduced the quality of the receiving
water below the criteria or in violation of any implementation plan was subject to enforcement action. Federal enforcement consisted of bringing suit for abatement after at least
180 days' notice of violation to the discharger. During the
180-day interim period, informal hearings were held to attempt to correct the violation.
Because of the cumbersome and time-consuming nature
of the 180-day notice procedure, the 1965 Amendments turned
out to be seriously deficient as an enforcement tool. Enforcement proceedings invariably consisted of endless rounds of
negotiations, which rarely culminated in court action. During the period of administration of the 1965 Amendments
by the Department of the Interior, few 180-day notice actions were initiated for violations of water quality standards.
None of these cases were resolved by judicial abatement under
the Act.1 4 A more vigorous enforcement program was conducted subsequent to the vesting of enforcement responsi12. 33 U.S.C. § 1171
13. 33 U.S.C. § 1158
14. Status Report of
mental Protection

(1970).
(1970).
180-Day Notice Actions prepared by the U.S. EnvironAgency, April 1972.
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bility with the Environmental Protection Agency in December of 1970."5 EPA initiated 144 actions prior to the enactment of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972; however, only four of these cases resulted in
actual court action by the Justice Department."
The Act was again amended in 19661" and 1970.18 The
Water Quality Improvement Act of 1970 provided for the
abatement of pollution by oil in the navigable waters of the
United States, adjoining shorelines or contiguous zones."l
Federal enforcement was authorized in the following instances:
1)

Failure to notify of an oil spill;20

2)

Knowingly discharging oil ;1

3)

Marine disaster creating a substantial pollution
hazard ;22

4)

Imminent and substantial threat by an offshore
or onshore facility ;8

5)

6)

Recovery of cleanup cost;2

Violation of removal and prevention regulations."

Perhaps the most effective federal law from an enforcement point of view prior to passage of the 1972 Act was the
1899 Refuse Act.26 This Act was revived and used as a valuable water pollution enforcement tool in 1970. It prohibits
the discharge of refuse into any navigable water of the United
States or its tributaries without a permit. The Refuse Act
15. Reorganization Plan No. 3 of 1970, 35 Fed. Reg. 15623 (1970), 5 U.S.C.
Reorg. Plan of 1970 No. 3 (1970).
16. U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, THm FIRST Two YEARS: A
REVIEW or EPA's ENFORCEMENT PROGRAM (1978).
17. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1153, 1155-1158, 1160, 1173, 1175, 431-487, and 466 (1970).
18. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1151-1175 (1970), amending Federal Water Pollution Control
Act of 1948, as amended, 33 U.S.C. §§ 466-66n (Supp. 1970).
19. 33 U.S.C. § 1161(b)(1) (1970).
20. 83 U.S.C. § 1161(b)(4) (1970).
21. 83 U.S.C. § 1161(b)(5) (1970).
1161(d) (1970).
22. 83 U.S.C.
23. 83 U.S.C. § 1161(e) (1970).
1161(f) (1970).
24. 83 U.S.C.
25. 83 U.S.C. § 1161(j) (1970).
§§
403, 407, 411 (1964). See also Rodgers. Industrial Water
26. 83 U.S.C.
Pollution and the Refuee Act: A Second Chance for Water Quality, 119
U. PENN. L. REV. 761 (1971).
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was administered by the Army Corps of Engineers primarily
in the interest of navigation. The Refuse Act permit program
was established by Executive Order on December 23, 1970,7
and took effect on July 1, 1971. The program required that all
discharges or deposits into navigable waters or their tributaries, or waste treatment systems other than municipal systems from which the matter flowed into navigable waters or
tributaries, should be made only pursuant to the conditions of
a permit issued by the Corps of Engineers. The EPA was
given responsibility for water quality determinations concerning the permit. The states participated to the extent that
they were required to certify that a proposed discharge would
not violate water quality standards. If a state denied certification, the permit could not be issued.
The Refuse Act permit program was short lived. On
December 21, 1971, a federal court in Kalur v. Resor 8 enjoined the Corps from issuing permits until it amended its
permit regulations to require compliance with the National
Environmental Policy Act. "9 That Act required all federal
agencies undertaking federal action significantly affecting
the quality of the human environment to prepare an environmental impact statement concerning the action." The court
also held that the Refuse Act only authorized issuance of permits for deposits into navigable waters and that no permits
could be issued for discharges into non-navigable tributaries of
navigable waters. These obstacles to the permit program were
removed by passage of the Amendnrlents of 1972.
B1ASIC PROVISIONS OF THE ACT

It was generally recognized that the policies and procedures established under existing and earlier laws were inadequate. While there were isolated cases of success,81 the
overall record of cleaning up the nation's waters was bleak.
At best the nation had merely held the line on pollution. The
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.

Executive Order 11574, C.F.R. § 309 (1973).
335 F. Supp. 1 (D.D.C. 1971).
42 U.S.C. §§ 4331-4347 (1970).
42 U.S.C. § 4332 (1970).
See COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY, ENVIRONMENTAL
CHAPTER 2, CLEANING UP THE WILLAMETTE (1973).
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effects of increased quality of treatment had been cancelled
by larger quantities of wastes. As a result of this failure,
Congress again turned toward strengthening the Federal
Water Pollution Control Act. After nearly three years of
deliberation, Congress passed the 1972 Amendments.
The 1972 Amendments abandoned the approach of prior
law which had the goal of making individual waters clean
enough to support one or more beneficial uses, such as swimming, fishng, water supply, and irrigation. The keystone of
the old approach was water quality standards which were
set to achieve the desired beneficial uses. It was well recognized that basing compliance and enforcement orders on a
case-by-case judgment of a particular discharger's impact on
ambient water quality was technically, legally and administratively difficult. Hence, the new Act rejected distinctions
among water bodies in terms of use. By contrast, it aims
"to restore and maintain the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the nation's water." 3 To achieve this objective, the Act set forth two principal goals:
1) That the discharge of pollutants into the navigable waters of the United States be eliminated
by 1985 ;33 and

That as an interim goal there be attained by 1983
water quality which provides for the protection
and propagation of fish, shellfish and wildlife,
and provides for recreation in and on the water. 4
The Act changed the emphasis from water quality standards to effluent limitations which together with the discharge permit program are the basic means toward achievement of the 1983 and 1985 goals.
The Act takes a three-phase approach toward achievement of the final goal of no discharge by 1985." 5 It provides
two interim dates of July 1, 1977, and July 1, 1983, by which
different levels of treatment must be achieved. Phase One,
October 18, 1972 to July 1, 1977, calls for achievement of
2)

32.
33.
34.
35.

33 U.S.C. § 1251(a)

(Supp. 1973).

33 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(1) (Supp. 1973).
83 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (2) (Supp. 1973).
33 U.S.C. § 1311 (Supp. 1973).
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effluent limitations which require application of the "best
practicable control technology currently available" by
all dischargers other than publicly owned treatment works."8
Publicly owned facilities must utilize "secondary treatment"37 and, if an industrial discharger uses such facilities,
certain "pretreatment standards" must be met. 8 In addition, by July 1, 1977, effluent limitations may be imposed so
that any criterion established pursuant to state law may be
met. 9
Phase Two, July 1, 1977 to July 1, 1983, calls for achievement of effluent limitations which represent the "best available technology economically achievable," by all dischargers
other than publicly owned treatment works."0 Such works will
be held to the standard of "best practicable waste treatment."
36. 33 U.S.C. § 1311(b)(1) (Supp. 1973). "Best practicable technology" will
represent the average of the best existing performance by well operated
plants within each industrial category. Where existing treatment is generally inadequate, EPA will set more stringent standards if technology can
be made available through good engineering practice at a reasonable cost.
37. Primary and secondary treatment are basic methods used to attain certain
removal efficiencies in waste water treatment. Primary treatment employs
processes of a physical nature such as screening, shredding, sedimentation,
and flotation, to remove the gross settleable and flotable solids as well as
up to 65 percent of the suspended solids, and as much as 40 percent of
oxygen-demanding substances.
Secondary treatment is the application of biological processes involving
the use of micro-organisms to oxidize waste materials, generally in addition to the primary treatment process. There are two principal types of
secondary treatment, the trickling filter method and the activated sludge
process. (Municipalities, however, are not limited to these methods.)
In the trickling filter method, the waste passes through a thick bed
of stones on which bacteria gather and multiply, until they consume most
of the organic matter in the sewage. The cleaner water trickles out through
pipes on the bottom of the filter for further treatment.
In the activated sludge process, the sewage leaves the settling tank in
primary treatment and is pumped into an aeration tank where it is mixed
with air and sludge containing bacteria, further breaking down the organic
matter. The solids are pumped into a sedimentation tank and the effluent
is chlorinated.
The effluent reduction attainable by secondary treatment is expressed
in terms of biochemical oxygen demand (BOD), suspended solids (SS), fecal
coliform bacteria (FC), and acidity-alkalinity (pH). BOD is a measure of
the amount of oxygen consumed during decomposition of organic matter.
Excessive depletion of oxygen reduced the usefulness of water.
For BOD the requirements are a maximum 30-day average of 30 milligrams per liter of water and for SS, a maximum 7-day average of 45 milligrams per liter.
A monthly maximum average of 200 per 100 milliliters of water and
a weekly average of 400 per 100 milliliters are required for fecal coliform
bacteria. The effluent pH must be within the range of 6 to 9.
38. 38 Fed. Reg. 30982 (1973).
39. Such criteria may include water quality standards or more stringent state
effluent standards.
40. 33 U.S.C. § 1311 (b) (2) (Supp. 1973). "Best available technology" will be
based on the very best control and treatment measures that have been or
are capable of being economically achieved.
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In addition, any other applicable pretreatment standards
must be achieved.
The third phase, July 1, 1983 to January 1, 1985, will be
devoted to attainment of the goal of no discharge of pollutants.
The terms "best practicable" and "best available technology" are being defined for various industries by effluent
guidelines issued by EPA." Such guidelines are adjusted
by various factors such as the age of the equipment or facilities involved, the process employed, the engineering aspects
of the application of control techniques, process changes, and
non-water quality environmental impact. 2
Water Quality Standards
Although the Act shifted emphasis from water quality
standards to effluent limitations, the new law did not ignore
the concept of water quality standards in achievement of
the 1983 and 1985 goals. The Act carried forward interstate
water quality standards set under the old law, provided that
such individual standards were consistent with the applicable
requirements of the Act. 3 Further, the Act carried forward
any previously established intrastate water quality standards
provided that they also were consistent with the applicable
requirements of the Act.4 If inconsistent or if no intrastate
standards existed, the states were required either to change
or set appropriate standards. EPA was given the authority
to reject state standards which failed to meet the requirements of the Act."5 EPA's rejection of all or a part of a
state's standards forced the state to present an acceptable
alternative. Failure to do so resulted in EPA setting the
41.

EPA failed to issue such guidelines within the statutory deadline of one
year from passage of the Act. Hence, the Natural Resources Defense
Council brought suit to force more timely issuance. As a result of NRDC
v. EPA, 6 ERC 1033 (D.D.C. 1973), EPA was ordered to publish effluent
guidelines as expeditiously as possible and no later than November 29, 1974.
To this end, the court imposed a publication schedule on EPA specifying
dates by which certain guidelines must be published.
42. 33 U.S.C. § 1314(b) (2) (A) (Supp. 1973).

43. 33 U.S.C. § 1313(a) (1) (Supp. 1973).

44. 33 U.S.C. § 1313(a) (2) (Supp. 1973).
45. To determine whether state standards met the requirements, EPA published Guidelines for Developing or Revising Water Quality Standards,
January 1973, amended April 1973.
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standard.4 6 If water quality standards cannot be protected
by the application of best practicable control technology by
industries and secondary treatment by publicly owned treatment works by July 1, 1977, then the states must establish
maximum daily loads of pollutants permitted in the waters
to allow the propagation of fish, shellfish and wildlife.4 7 A
similar procedure is required for establishment of maximum
daily load of thermal discharges.
Water Quality Related Effluent Limitations
If at any time it is determined that application of best
available control technology by 1983 will not assure protection of public water supplies, agricultural and industrial
uses, and the protection and propagation of fish, shellfish
and wildlife, and allow recreational activities in and on the
water, additional effluent limitations must be established to
assure attainment or maintenance of water quality. 8 In
setting such limitations, EPA must consider the relationship
of the economic and social costs of their achievement, including any economic or social dislocation in the affected
community or communities, the social and economic benefits
to be obtained, and determine whether or not such effluent
limitations can be implemented with available technology
or other alternative control strategies.4"
Toxic and Pretreatment Effluent Standards
In addition to the establishment of effluent standards,
the Act required EPA to set toxic and pretreatment effluent
standards." Toxic effluent standards address pollutants or
combinations of pollutants which, after discharge and upon
either direct or indirect exposure to any organism, will cause
death, disease, or other abnormalities in the organism or its
Such pollutants include mercury, cyanide and
offspring.'
2
In setting such standards, EPA was given aucadmium.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.

33
33
33
33
33
33
38

U.S.C. § 1313(a) (3) (Supp. 1973).
U.S.C. § 1313(d) (1) (Supp. 1973).
U.S.C. § 1312(a) (Supp. 1973).
U.S.C. § 1312(b) (1) (Supp. 1973).
U.S.C. § 1317 (Supp. 1973).
U.S.C. § 1362(13) (Supp. 1973).
Fed. Reg. 35388 (1973).
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thority to completely prohibit the discharge of toxic pollutants if necessary."
Pretreatment standards cover those pollutants which
are determined not to be susceptible to treatment by publicly
owned treatment works or which would interfere with the
operation of such works. 4 Thus, pretreatment standards
may require any industry discharging such pollutants into
a municipal sewage treatment plant to pretreat its effluent.
National Standards of Performance
In addition to setting effluent standards for existing
sources, the Act requires EPA to set new source performance
standards for 27 major types of industry." Such standards
must reflect the greatest degree of effluent reduction determined to be achievable by application of the "best available
demonstrated control technology," orocesses, operating methods, or other alternatives, including where practicable, a
In estabstandard permitting no discharge of pollutants.5
lishing such standards, EPA must take into consideration
the cost of achieving such effluent reduction, and any nonwater quality environmental impact and energy requirements. 7 The purpose of establishing national standards of
performance is to assure that new sources of water pollution
are designed, built, equipped and operated to minimize the
discharge of pollutants.
Inspection, Monitoring and Entry Requirements
The Act created authority for EPA to require the owner
or operator of each point source to install, use, and maintain
monitoring equipment; to sample effluents; to establish and
maintain records; to make reports; and to provide such other
information as EPA may reasonably require.5 " It also gave
EPA the right to enter any premises where an effluent
source or records pertaining thereto are located, to have
access to copy any records, to inspect any required monitoring
53. 33 U.S.C. § 1317(a) (1) (Supp. 1973).
54. 33 U.S.C. § 1317(b) (1) (Supp. 1973).
55.
56.
57.
58.

33
33
33
33

U.S.C.
US.C.
U.S.C.
U.S.C.

§
§
§
§

1316 (Supp. 1973).
1316(a)(1) (Supp. 1973).
1316(b)(1)(B) (Supp. 1973).
1318 (Supp. 1973).
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equipment and to sample any effluents which the owner or
operator is required to sample. 9 Further, any records, reports, or information obtained must, in the case of effluent
data, be related to applicable effluent limitations, toxic, preThey
treatment, or new source performance standards."
must also be available to the public unless entitled to protection as a trade secret. 1 The purpose of these requirements
is twofold. First, it will provide the necessary information
to assure compliance with the Act by dischargers. Second, it
will provide the data base upon which EPA can guide its
actions to assure that the 1983 and 1985 goals will be met.
The National Pollution Discharge Elimination System
Under the Act no discharge is permitted except as is
authorized by a discharge permit. 2 This requirement applies
to municipal as well as industrial discharges. Discharge permits must be consistent with effluent limitations, water
quality standards and other requirements of the Act.6" They
may not exceed a period of five years" and may be revoked
or modified when a violation of a permit condition takes place
or when changed conditions dictate the need for further reduction of the permitted discharge. 5 With limited exceptions, discharge permits are no longer issued under the River
and Harbor Act of 1899."0 However, permits previously issued under the 1899 Act remain in effect until they expire."'
Discharges not previously subject to the permit requirements
under the 1899 Act were given until April 14, 1973, within
which to apply under the new Act.6
The Act established the National Pollution Discharge
Elimination System (NPDES) which gave permit authority
to EPA but contemplates state participation and operation. 9
Regulations concerning elements necessary for state partici59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.

33
33
33
33
33
33
33
33
33
33
33

U.S.C. § 1318(a) (Supp. 1973).
U.S.C. § 1318(b) (Supp. 1973).
U.S.C. § 1318(b) (Supp. 1973).
U.S.C. §§ 1311(a) (1), 1342(a) (1) (Supp. 1973).
U.S.C. § 1342(a) (1) (Supp. 1973).
U.S.C. § 1342(b) (1) (B) (Supp. 1973).
U.S.C. § 1342(b) (1) (C) (Supp. 1973).
U.S.C. § 1342(a) (5) (Supp. 1973).
U.S.C. § 1342(a) (4) (Supp. 1973).
U.S.C. § 1342(k) (Supp. 1973).
U.S.C. § 1342(b) (Supp. 1973).
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pation in the NPDES have been published." When a state
permit program is found acceptable by EPA, permit issuance is turned over to the state.7 1 After a state program
goes into effect, EPA retains the right, unless waived, to
review proposed permits to determine whether they meet the
requirements of the Act.72 If a state fails to properly administer its program, EPA may revoke the entire delegation. 8
The Act provides an immunity defense against some enforcement actions until December 1974, where a permit has been
applied for pursuant to the Act but which has not been given
a "final administrative decision.""
SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION

A. General Application
The basic prohibition of the Act is found in Section
301(a) which provides that, except as in compliance with
other sections of the Act, "the discharge of any pollutant by
any person shall be unlawful.'"'" The Act broadly defines
the term "discharge of a pollutant" as:
any addition of any pollutant to navigable
waters from any point source,
(B) any addition of any pollutant to the waters of
the contiguous zone or the ocean from any point
source other than a vessel or other floating
craft.76
Thus, enforcement of the general prohibition against discharges applies only to point sources which are defined as:
(A)

70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.

[a]ny discernible, confined and discrete conveyance,
including but not limited to any pipe, ditch, channel,
tunnel, conduit, well, discrete fissure, container, rolling stock, concentrated animal feeding operation,
or vessel or other floating craft, from which pollutants are or may be discharged, or from which there
is or may be a thermal discharge.7
40 C.F.R. § 124 (1972).
33 U.S.C. § 1342(b) (Supp. 1973).
33 U.S.C. § 1342(d) (2) (Supp. 1973).
33 U.S.C. § 1342(c) (3) (Supp. 1973).
33
83
83
33

U.S.C. § 1342(k)
U.S.C. § 1311(a)
U.S.C. § 1362(12)
U.S.C. § 1362(14)

(Supp 1973).
(Supp. 1973).
(Supp. 1973).
(Supp. 1973).
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Since this definition encompasses virtually all major sources
of pollution, this apparent restraint should be nominal insofar as enforcement of the Act is concerned. Even if the Act
did not contain such a limitation, practical realities would
have had a similar effect. Non-point sources are extremely difficult to control inasmuch as non-point source
wastes that create water quality problems are more diffuse
than those resulting from municipal and industrial activities
and generally cause widespread environmental degradation
instead of easily identifiable point-source impacts.
Inasmuch as the discharge permit requirements of the
Act apply equally to small farmers and large industries,
EPA took the position that it had discretion to distinguish
among categories and sizes of agricultural sources. Consequently, EPA promulgated regulations excluding certain
agricultural discharges from NPDES requirements." The
basis of such exclusions was that the expenditure in resources
necessary to process discharge permit applications from every
small farmer would be disproportionate to the water quality
benefits obtained. In order to prevent the diversion of the
EPA's resources from the larger, more significant point
sources of pollution, the EPA by regulation excluded the
smaller, less significant agricultural and silvicultural discharges including some irrigation return flows and runoff
from fields, orchards, crop and forest lands. It is significant to note, however, that such exclusions apply only to the
necessity to apply for a NPDES discharge permit and are
not exemptions from the Act. A point source falling within
such exemption is nevertheless subject to enforcement under the Act if it is discharging pollutants in such quantities
as to warrant enforcement action.
B. Navigable Waters
S. 2770 defined the term navigable waters to mean "the
navigable waters of the United States, portions thereof, and
78. 38 Fed. Reg. 18000 (1973). For example, exclusions include animal feedoperations less than 1,000 feeder cattle and irrigation return flows where
return flow is from land areas of less than 3,000 contiguous acres.
The Natural Resources Defense Council has taken issue with EPA's
position. NRDC v. EPA, No. 1629-73 (D.D.C. 1974). It is NRDC's contention that EPA has no authority to distinguish between categories and sizes
of agricultural sources.
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the tributaries thereof, including the territorial seas and the
Great Lakes." 9 H.B. 11896 defined the term to mean "the
navigable waters of the United States, including the territorial seas." 8 Section 502(7) of the Conference Bill, which
became the Act, defines it as "the waters of the United
States including the territorial seas.""' Thus, after dropping
the word "navigable" the Conference Bill adopted the House
definition of the term. The Senate Consideration of the Report of the Conference Committee contains the following
statement.
One matter of importance throughout the legislation is the meaning of the term "navigable waters of
the United States."
The conference agreement does not define the
term. The Conferees fully intend that the term
"navigable waters" be given the broadest possible
constitutional interpretation unencumbered by agency determinations which have been made or may be
made for administrative purposes.
Based on the history of consideration of this
legislation, it is obvious that its provisions and the
extent of application should be construed broadly.
It is intended that the term "navigable waters" include all water bodies, such as lakes, streams, and
rivers, regarded as public navigable waters in law
which are navigable in fact. It is further intended
that such waters shall be considered to be navigable
in fact when they form, in their ordinary condition
by themselves or by uniting with other waters or
other systems of transportation, such as highways
or railroads, a continuing highway over which commerce is or may be carried on with other States or
with foreign countries in the customary means of
trade and travel in which commerce is conducted today. In such cases the commerce on such waters
would have a substantial economic effect on interstate commerce.8 2
79. S. 2770, 92d Cong., 1st Sess., § 502(h) (1971).
80. H.B. 11896, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., § 502(8) (1972).
81. SENATE CONFERENCE REPORT No. 92-1236, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 144 (1972).
82. Senate Consideration of the Report of the Conference Committee, as reported in COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC WORKS, 93d CONG., 1st SEss., A LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY OF THE WATER POLLUTION CONTROL ACT AMENDMENTS OF 1972, at
178 (Comm. Print 1973).
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During the House Consideration of the Report of the
Conference Committee Rep. Dingell discussed the term as
follows:
Third, the conference bill defines the term
"navigable waters" broadly for water quality purposes. It means all "the waters of the United
States" in a geographical sense. It does not mean
"navigable waters of the United States" in the
technical sense as we sometimes see in some laws.
Although most interstate commerce 150 years ago
was accomplished on waterways, there is no requirement in the Constitution that the waterway must
cross a State boundary in order to be within the
interstate commerce power of the Federal Government. Rather, it is enough that the waterway serves
as a link in the chain of commerce among the States
as it flows in the various channels of transportation
-highways, railroads, air traffic, radio and postal
communications, waterways, et cetera. The "gist of
the Federal test" is the waterway's use "as a highway," not whether it is "part of a navigable interstate or international commercial highway."
Thus, this new definition clearly encompasses
all water bodies, including main streams and their
tributaries, for water quality purposes. No longer
are the old, narrow definitions of navigability, as
determined by the Corps of Engineers, going to
govern matters covered by this bill. Indeed, the conference report states on page 144:
"The conferees fully intend that the term navigable waters be given the broadest possible constitutional interpretation unencumbered by agency determinations which have been made or may be made
for administrative purposes."2a
As a result of the above legislative history, the EPA
determined that the deletion of the word "navigable" from
the definition of navigable waters eliminates the requirement
of navigability. Pollution of water courses which fall within
the purview of the Act must only be capable of affecting
83. Id. at 250.
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interstate commerce in order for federal jurisdiction to attach. 4 EPA reasoned that the term "navigable waters of
the United States" depended upon the application of two
tests: first, the waters in question were required to be navigable in fact, and second, that the waters had to be capable of
being used in interstate commerce."5 Since the navigability
requirement had been removed, this left only the interstate
commerce requirement.
For the purposes of making initial administrative determinations, the EPA concluded that the following are
"waters of the United States":
(1) All navigable waters of the United States;
(2) Tributaries of navigable waters of the United
States;
(3) Interstate waters;
(4) Intrastate lakes, rivers, and streams which are
utilized by interstate travelers for recreational
or other purposes;
(5) Intrastate lakes, rivers, and streams from which
fish or shellfish are taken and sold in interstate
commerce; and
(6) Intrastate lakes, rivers, and streams which are
utilized for industrial purposes by industries in
interstate commerce. 6
The navigability question has already been considered
by two courts. In United States v. Ashland Oil and Transportation Co.,87 the defendant was charged under Section 311
(b) (5) of the Act for failing to immediately notify an appropriate federal agency after gaining knowledge that it had
discharged oil into a non-navigable stream. In denying defendant's motion to dismiss on the grounds that the Act applies only to the classical "navigable waters of the United
States" the court held that navigability was not an element
84. See memorandum from Asst. Administration for Enforcement and General
Counsel to All Regional Counsels, reported in Environment Reporter, III
Current Developments 1240 (February 9, 1973).
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. United States v. Ashland Oil & Transportation Co., 364 F. Supp. 349 (W.D.
Ky. 1973) (This case is presently on appeal.)
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of the offense. The court further held that in prosecution
under the Act, the government is not required to establish
the effect on interstate commerce of any particular discharge or of any particular stream. The court relied on the
Act's legislative history in noticing "that water pollution is
a national problem severely affecting the health of our people,
the welfare of the nation and the efficient conduct of interstate commerce." The court further held that congressional
attention to the effects of pollution on interstate commerce
allows federal regulation of any activity within the class of
pollution discharges or class of streams without regard to
whether a particular discharge or stream has a discernible
interstate effect.
In United States v. Holland,88 the court in holding nonnavigable mosquito canals and mangrove wetlands to be within
the purview of the Act, stated that Congress is not limited
by the "navigable waters" test in its authoriy to control pollution under the Commerce Clause and that the legislative
history of the Act manifests a clear intent to break from prior
limitations to get at the sources of pollution.
C. Ground Water
The Act does not specifically address EPA's enforcement authority over ground waters. The national goal of
abatement of pollution by 1985 contained in Section 101 refers only to "navigable waters." However, if the basis for
authority over surface waters is no longer tied to the navigability requirement, but rather to a showing that interstate
commerce is affected, then there should be no reason why the
Act should not be extended to ground waters. If the navigability issue is still viable, it may be argued that since tributaries of navigable waters may be subject to federal control
because they affect navigable waters, ground-water, which
also affects navigable waters, may be subject to federal
regulation.89
88. 6 ERC 1388 (M.D. Fla. 1974).
89. Comment, Ground Water Pollution in the Western States-PrivateRemedies
and Federal and State Legislation, 8 LAND & WATER L. RE . 537, 551
(1973).
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If the broad assertion that the Act extends to ground
waters as well as surface waters is not accepted, there is
nevertheless authority contained in the Act which supports
the argument that EPA does have power to control the disposal of pollutants into wells for the purpose of preventing
the eventual contamination of surface waters. Section 402
(a) (3) provides that the permit program run by EPA shall
be subject to the same terms and conditions which apply to a
state permit program under Section 402. Subsection (b) (1)
(D) of Section 402 requires a state to have authority to control disposal of pollutants into wells. Wells are included in
the definition of a point source."0 Hence, it could be argued
that EPA may control discharges of pollutants from wells.
Furthermore, the Administrator is expressly charged by
Section 102(a) to develop "comprehensive programs for preventing, reducing, or eliminating the pollution of the navigable waters and ground waters and improving the sanitary
condition of surface and underground waters." Enforcement authority over the discharge of pollutants to ground
waters would enhance the Administrator's ability to carry
out his responsibility to provide comprehensive programs
under Section 10 2 (a).
ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS UNDER SECTION 309 GENERALLY

The most important of the enforcement procedures provided by the 1972 Act are set out in Section 309. This section provides the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency with a wide variety of enforcement remedies
ranging from administrative compliance orders to criminal
fines of up to $50,000 per day and imprisonment for up to
two years. Enforcement action under Section 309 can be
initiated by the Administrator against any discharges in
violation of Sections 301, 302, 306, 307 or 308 of the Act, or
against any person in violation of any condition or limitation
implementing any of the foregoing sections in a NPDES
permit issued by the Administrator pursuant to Section 402
of the Act. The Administrator may also initiate enforce90. 83 U.S.C. § 1362(14) (Supp. 1978).
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ment action under Section 309 for violations of NPDES permits issued by a state pursuant to a federally approved
permit program.91
The Act has, however, provided an immunity defense to
enforcement actions for violations of Sections 301 (effluent
limitations) and 306 (new source performance standards).
This defense is set out in Section 402(k) of the Act, which
provides that any discharger who has a pending application
for a N-PDES permit on file with the Administrator, and
who has not in any way delayed final administrative disposition of such application, shall be deemed in compliance with
Sections 301 and 306 for purposes of Section 309 until December 31, 1974. Although the immunity defense does not
apply to violations of Sections 302 (water quality related
effluent standards), 307 (toxic pollutants), and 308 (inspections and monitoring), the immunity provision of Section
402(k) is of great importance in view of the fact that the
effuent limitations provided by Section 301 constitute the
fundamental regulatory feature of the Act.
Because of the broad scope of the immunity provision of
Section 402(k), the issuance of NPDES permits is crucial to
the conduct of any serious enforcement program by the Administrator, at least prior to January 1, 1975. That EPA
has recognized this fact is evidenced by the high priority
the Agency has assigned to the issuance of permits to major
industrial dischargers.9 2 Consequently the possession and
subsequent violation by a discharger of the terms and conditions of its permit will provide the factual background for
the great majority of enforcement actions under Section 309,
and the provisions of Section 309 will be discussed herein
primarily in this context.
COMPLIANCE ORDERS-SEcTION

309 (a) (3)

Whenever the Administrator" has made a finding that
a discharger is in violation of its NPDES permit, he has a
91. 33 U.S.C. § 1319(a) (3) (Supp. 1973).
92. Memorandum from John Quarles, Acting Deputy Administrator to EPA
Regional Administrators. August 21, 1973.
93. Since the Administrator has subdelegated his enforcement authority under
the Act to the Administrators of EPA's ten regional offices [EPA ORDER
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statutory mandate under Section 309(a) (3) to initiate one
of two types of enforcement actions: he can either (1) issue
an order requiring the violator to comply with the terms and
conditions of its permit, or (2) bring a civil action pursuant
to the provisions of Section 309(b). As stated above, the
language of Section 309(a) (3) places a mandatory duty on
the Administrator to initiate some kind of enforcement
action in every case of a finding of violation. Since EPA's
resources are limited, and since the number of reported permit violations will probably be large and varied in degree of
severity, it would seem inevitable that the Administrator
will attempt to exercise some form of prosecutorial discretion
in implementing the enforcement provisions of Section 309.
Whether such discretionary enforcement is allowable in view
of the language of Section 309 is questionable; this issue has
arisen in the context of Section 13 of the Rivers and Harbors
Act of 1899." Section 17 of the 1899 Act"6 provides that "it
shall be the duty of the district attorneys . . . to vigorously

prosecute all offenders whenever requested to do so by the
Secretary of War ....

."

The Justice Department has exer-

cised prosecutorial discretion in enforcing this Act, and the
question of its authority to do so has been discussed by the
courts. In United States v. U.S. Steel Corp.,96 the court in
dictum stated that the Justice Department has a mandatory

duty to prosecute actions when requested; however, in Bass
Anglers Sportsman's Society v. Scholze Tannery," the court
held that the Justice Department has absolute discretion to
prosecute Refuse Act violations. The issue of the Administrator's discretionary power to initiate enforcement actions has
particular importance in light of the citizen suit provisions of
Section 505 of the Act.
As stated above, Section 309 (a) (3) is phrased so that
the Administrator must choose between issuance of a compliance order and filing of a civil action; he cannot take both
actions simultaneously. If the Administrator determines to

94.
95.
96.
97.

No. 1260.6, Sept. 14, 1973], subsequent references in this article to the
term "Administrator" are meant to include the Regional Administrators as
well as the National Administrator of EPA.
33 U.S.C. § 407 (1964).
83 U.S.C. § 413 (1964).
328 F. Supp. 354 (N.D. Ind. 1970).
329 F. Supp. 339 (E.D. Tenn. 1971).
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issue an administrative compliance order, he must follow the
procedure set out in Section 309(a) (4) ; this subsection states
the required contents of a compliance order, and establishes
the procedure for service of such an order.
(1) Contents: The order must state with "reasonable
specificity" the nature of the violation and should indicate
what the violator must achieve to satisfy the order. The order
must further state a reasonable time for compliance, which
cannot exceed 30 days. In specifying a time for compliance,
the Administrator must take into account the seriousness of
the discharge and its impact on receiving waters, and any
good faith efforts undertaken by the discharger to comply
with the terms and conditions of its permits. If a compliance
schedule has been incorporated into the permit condition, the
permittee's progress in meeting such schedule would presumably be an important factor to be considered in specifying the time for compliance.
If the order is being issued for violation of monitoring
requirements, under authority of Section 308, the order does
not become effective until the recipient has had an opportunity to confer with the Administrator or his designee. Under these circumstances, an order issued on the basis of the
permittee's violation of monitoring requirements would thus
be in the nature of an administrative order to. show cause.
(2) Procedure: Subsections 309(a) (3) and (4) do not
provide for an administrative hearing prior to the issuance
of a compliance order. The findings of fact by the Administrator which are a condition precedent to the issuance of
such order are thus made ex parte. Section 309 (a) (4) provides that copies of the compliance order must be sent to the
state in which the violation occurs, and to any other state or
states affected by the discharge-presumably those states
located immediately downstream from the point of the violator's discharge.
The original of the compliance order is required to be
issued by personal service upon the violator. Once service
is obtained, the violator would have an immediate right of
judicial review under Sections 10(a) and (e) of the Adminishttps://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol9/iss2/2
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trative Procedure Act,98 since Section 309 does not provide for
review of administrative compliance orders, and since the
recipient of such an order would have standing to seek judicial
review." Presumably, such review would consist of a trial
de novo in the appropriate federal district court, and would
take the form of an action for declaratory judgment or an
action for civil injunctive relief."0
If the compliance order is upheld on appeal, and the violator fails to comply with the terms of the order, the Administrator may then take action to enforce the order.
Probably the most effective course of action at this stage
would be the filing by the Administrator of a civil action for
injunctive relief to enforce the terms of the compliance order.
Such action is not, however, expressly authorized by Section
309; the only reference to enforcement of a compliance order
is in Section 309(d), which provides for civil penalties of up
to $10,000 per day for violation of such order. Authority to
sue for injunctive relief may, however, be implicit in Section
309, in view of the authority provided by Section 309(a) (3),
which allows the Administrator to proceed directly to such
a remedy, and in view of the citizen suit provisions of Section 505, which, inter alia, authorizes a private citizen to commence such an action against any person in violation of an
order issued by the Administrator. It would be patently absurd to read the Act as authorizing private citizens to sue to
enforce an order of the Administrator, while denying such
authority to the Administrator himself.
Issuance and subsequent enforcement of administrative
compliance orders will necessarily be a cumbersome and timeconsuming process, in view of the lack of statutory provision
98. 5 U.S.C. § 704(a) and (c) (1967).
99. See 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1967), and cases annotated thereunder, particularly
Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136 (1967). In Abbott, the Supreme Court held that an agency order requiring a party to make signifi.cant financial expenditures is sufficiently "adverse" for purposes of the
statute when failure by the party to comply subjects it to potential civil
and criminal liability. This holding clearly applies to an order issued by
the Administrator pursuant to PUB. L. No. 92-500, § 309(a) (3) (Oct. 18,
1972), since the failure by the recipient to comply with such an order
renders it liable to civil and criminal sanctions, as discussed infra.
100. 5 U.S.C. § 703 (1967).
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for administrative review procedures.'' For this reason,
administrative compliance orders will be most effective in
cases where such orders are not likely to be challenged by
the recipient, or where the Agency has tentatively determined
not to take punitive action against the violator. Cases where
compliance orders would appear to be justified are: (1)
where a permit holder fails to meet a compliance schedule
incorporated in its permit, where such failure results from
causes beyond the control of the permit holder, (2) where
minor or isolated permit violations are involved, or (3) where
a "first-time" permit violation by a particular discharger is
involved. The violator's past record of cooperation under
its permit would, of course, be an important factor in any
decision by the Administrator as to what enforcement option
to utilize. In the foregoing cases, the chief purpose of an administrative order is to remind the violator that he is expected to comply with the provisions of his permit, and that
his failure to do so will result in the initiation of an enforcement action by the Agency.
Administrative compliance orders will also serve as a key
element in the development of the Agency's enforcement
record on the permit violation, which may prove valuable in
the event a judicial enforcement action is subsequently initiated against the violator.

CIVI ACTIONS UNDER SECTION 309(b)
As an alternative to issuing an administrative compliance order, the Administrator is authorized by Section 309 (b)
to proceed directly to a judicial remedy in cases of NPDES
permit violations. This subsection authorizes the Admin101. The chief advantage of administrative enforcement remedies over their
judicial counterparts is that the former can be expedited to a much greater
degree, depending, of course, on the statutory authority and enforcement
"will" of the particular agency involved. However, this advantage is almost completetly negated when the authorizing statute fails to provide
a procedure for administrative review of the agency's enforcement order
(with the resulting instructions on judicial review), since, in the absence
of such a procedure, the recipient is by constitutional right entitled to a
judicial trial de novo with the standard burden of proof on the agency; no
shift or reduction in such burden results from issuance of the order. Thus
the order essentially has no legal effect-the enforcing agency might just
as well have started with its judicial remedy. See generally 1 K. DAvis,
AIMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 7.10, at 448 (1958).
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istrator to "commence a civil action for appropriate relief,
including a permanent or temporary injunction" for such
violations. In most cases, the remedy sought by the Administrator under Section 309(b) will be civil injunctive relief.
In some cases the requested relief will be in the form of a
prohibitory injunction, enjoining the permit holder from
making further discharges from its facilities; however, in a
majority of these suits the Administrator will seek a mandatory injunction, requiring the discharger to take affirmative
action to alter its discharge to bring such discharge into compliance with its permit. Since the Administrator may seek,
and the court has authority to require, any relief that is appropriate to bring the permit holder into compliance with
its permit, the Administrator has authority to request an
extensive variety of remedial actions by a permit holder.
This broad authority is consistent with the prevailing rule
that the government, when in the capacity of a plaintiff in
a civil injunctive action to enforce a statute designed to protect the public interest, is entitled to relief that ensures the
full effectiveness of the statute involved.0 2 In addition, it is
well established that the Administrator when acting in this
capacity is not required to allege and prove irreparable harm,
which iS the standard burden of proof imposed on private
litigants in civil injunctions; he need only show a violation
of the subject statute to be entitled to the appropriate
0
remedy'
It is not clear whether the Administrator can obtain
monetary damages under Section 309(b). Although there
is no express provision authorizing damages, such relief may
be available in view of the statutory language providing for
"appropriate relief." Monetary damages may be appropriate
in some cases. For example, where a discharger in the course
of violating its permit causes a substantial fish kill, monetary
damages could be used to pay for the restocking of the stream.
In any event, it is clear that the government, in a civil suit
for injunctive relief, is entitled to equivalent costs in dam102. Wyandotte Transportation Co. v. United States, 389 U.S. 191 (1967);
United States v. Underwood, 344 F. Supp. 486 (M.D. Fla. 1972); United
States v. Douglas County, 5 ERC 1577 (D.C. Nev. 1973).
103. Hecht v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 321 (1944) ; Shafer v. United States, 229 F.2d
124 (4th Cir. 1956).
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ages, in situations where the government is compelled to perform the remedy.'
If federal funds were somehow utilized
to restock a stream depleted by a fish kill caused by the defendant, the government could recover from the defendant
an amount equal to the federal expenditures.
Section 309(b) thus provides, either expressly or implicitly, a broad range of remedies to the Administrator, if
he elects to proceed by commencing a civil action against the
permit violator.
The type of remedy authorized by Section 309(b) would
appear to be best suited to situations involving permit violations of a continuing nature, for example, where the permit
holder has consistently failed to meet the compliance schedule incorporated in its permit, and as a result is exceeding
either the interim or final effluent limitations imposed by
the permit. In this situation, the primary objective of the
Agency would be to force the discharger into compliance
with the terms and conditions of its permit as quickly as
possible, since protection of the receiving waters is of paramount importance. Punitive remedies such as those provided
in subsections (e) and (d) of Section 309 are unquestionably
effective in encouraging voluntary compliance, but the nature of the relief provided in these subsections (i.e., fines
and civil penalties) limits their effectiveness in achieving
specific remedial action on the part of the discharger. An action for a criminal fine or civil penalty could, of course, accompany a civil suit for injunctive relief under Section
309(b).
The procedural requirements of Section 309(b) provide
that actions be brought in the District Court of the United
States for the district in which the defendant is located, resides, or is doing business. Section 309(b) further requires
that when a civil action is filed, notice of such action shall
be given to the appropriate state; such states would include
the state where the action has been filed, and any state located immediately downstream from the permit violator.
104.

Wyandotte Transportation Co. v. United States, supra note 102; United
States v. Perma Paving Co., 332 F.2d 754 (2d Cir. 1964); United States v.
Underwood, supra note 102.
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A section of the Act which has particular relevance to
actions under Section 309(b) is Section 506, which provides
that the Justice Department shall represent the United States
in any civil or criminal suit initiated under the Act to which
the Administrator is a party. This means that the regional
offices of EPA will refer proposed enforcement actions to
the various United States Attorneys' offices in much the
same manner as referrals of proposed actions under the 1899
Refuse Act. However, Section 506 further provides that if
the Justice Department fails to notify the Administrator
within a "reasonable time" that it will appear in a proposed
civil action, EPA's own attorneys are authorized to represent
the government. Note that this exception applies only to
civil actions, and it is highly unlikely that the Justice Department will abdicate its responsibilities in this area by
failing to give timely notification. It is possible, however,
that if the Justice Department were to determine that a proposed civil action against a permit violator was not justified,
either for lack of evidence or for policy reasons, EPA attorneys could directly appear and represent the government in
the action. It is likely that, in the vast majority of enforcement cases, the government will be represented by the appropriate United States Attorneys' Office, with EPA Regional
enforcement attorneys acting in support.
It also seems likely that, in order to avoid the necessity
of costly and time-consuming litigation, the majority of civil
actions under Section 309(b) will be resolved by means of
settlements negotiated between EPA, the Justice Department,
and the permit violator. This was often the result in civil
actions under the Refuse Act instituted by the Justice Department against industrial dischargers. Such negotiated
settlements presumably would be incorporated into the terms
of a consent decree which would be submitted to the court
having jurisdiction over the action. Upon the court's approval, the consent decree would have the force and effect of
a final judgment on the merits. This procedure is now subject to the public notice requirements of rules and regulations
promulgated by the Justice Department." 5
105. 28 C.F.R. § 50.7 (1973).
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Section 309(e) requires that whenever a Section 309(b)
action is filed against a municipality, the state in which the
municipality is located is required to be joined as a party to
the action. In the event a judgment is obtained against the
defendant municipality, the state is liable for contribution
to the extent that the state's municipal corporation laws
prevent the municipality from raising revenues necessary to
comply with the terms of the judgment.
CRIMINAL AcTIoNs UNDER SECTION 309(c)
Section 309(c) provides for criminal penalties of varying amounts. Subsection (c) (1) provides that willful or
negligent violations of NPDES permits shall be punishable
by a fine of not less than $2,500 nor more than $25,000 per
day of vioation, or by imprisonment for not more than one
year, or both. Second convictions can bring a fine of up to
$50,000 per day of violation, or imprisonment for up to two
years, or both. Lesser penalties are provided by Section
309(c) for falsification of reports required under the Act.
Subsection 309(c) (1) does not expressly provide for criminal penalties for violation of administrative compliance
orders issued under Section 309 (a) (3); however, it would
seem that such penalties would be available against willful or negligent violators, since such orders essentially act
as notices of violation of a permit and specify a time limit
for correction; subsequent violation of a compliance order
would thus constitute a willful violation of the subject permit, and would render the willful or negligent violator liaable to criminal penalties. While a Section 309(c) action can
be filed simultaneously with the issuance of a compliance
order, the combining of the two would not, in most cases, seem
to be proper from a policy standpoint, since criminal prosecutions are restricted to negligent or willful violators, a class
which presumably would not qualify for the "grace period"
provided by compliance orders.
Section 309(c) (3) provides that responsible corporate
officials are also subject to criminal prosecution. Whether
criminal proceedings under Section 309(c) will be instituted
https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol9/iss2/2
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against corporate officials remains to be seen; however, it is
noteworthy that EPA did not favor this approach when it
was referring prosecutions to the Justice Department under
the Refuse Act. In any event, there are valid reasons for
electing to bring a criminal action against the corporate entity, rather than against an official of the corporation; in
the former case, the government is not confronted with the
constitutional privilege against self-incrimination,"'6 while in
the latter case, it may be more difficult to prove the necessary elements of willfulness or negligence. In addition, it
seems likely that the government would be more successful
in obtaining large monetary fines when a corporate defendant is involved, particularly when the case is tried before a
jury.
Criminal prosecutions under Section 309(c) would seem
to be particularly effective when used against dischargers
who have refused to file applications for a NPDES permit;
in such cases, the immunity provisions of Section 402(k)
would not apply, and the problems of proving a willful or
negligent violation would be minimal. Criminal prosecutions
could also be utilized in conjunction with civil actions under
Section 309(b) in the same manner as the simultaneous filing of criminal and civil actions by the Justice Department
under the Refuse Act.
CivIL PENALTIES UNDER SECTION

309(d)

The final enforcement alternative provided by Section
309 is set out in Section 309(d), which provides for civil
penalties of up to $10,000 per day of violation. Actions for
collection of civil penalties under Section 309(d) can be
brought either for violation of a compliance order issued
under Section 309 (a) (3), or directly for a permit violation.
As in actions under 309(b) and (c), the appearance provisions of Section 506 apply to actions under 309(d), and the
Administrator is required to make initial referral of such
actions to the Justice Department.
106. Campbell Painting Corp. v. Reid, 392 U.S. 286 (1967); United States v.
White, 322 U.S. 694 (1944).
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In actions instituted under 309(d), the burden of proof
imposed on the government would be the civil standard of a
preponderance of the evidence, rather than the criminal
burden of beyond a reasonable doubt. Neither negligence
nor intent are elements of the offense described in 309(d),
and consequently the government would not be required to
prove their existence. Under the strict liability wording of
this subsection, the government would merely be required
to prove responsibility for the violation in order to prevail.
If an action to collect a civil penalty were instituted for
violation of an administrative compliance order, the issuance
of which had been appealed by the recipient as discussed
above, any judicial findings of fact in the earlier proceeding
would, in all probability, be admissible in the subsequent
proceeding through the principle of collateral estoppel. The
application of this principle would, of course, be conditioned
on the government's ability to sustain its burden of showing
identity of the issues and a final determination on the merits
in the preceding action." 7 This may be difficult, since in
some cases the alleged violations of a compliance order may
well be based upon facts which differ from those involved
in the initial permit violation, upon which the original issuance of the compliance order was based.
In addition to the relaxed burden of proof and the absence of certain required elements of proof, there are several
other inherent advantages in bringing a civil action under
Section 309(d), as opposed to initiating criminal action under Section 309(c). In a civil action, the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination would not apply, pleading
would be more simple, and the government would retain the
0 8 In
right of appeal, in the event it lost in the trial court."
view of the foregoing considerations, it is likely that the
government will elect to bring a far greater number of actions
under Section 309(d) than under Section 309(c).
The wording of Section 309 does not preclude the combining of a civil penalty action with the issuance of an admin107.

See generally RESTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS, § 68 (1942).

108. A good discussion of criminal and civil penalties in the context of air pollution control can be found in Kovel, A Case for Civil Penalties: Air Pollution Control, 46 J. URB. L. 153 (1969).
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istrative order pursuant to Section 309 (a) (3). This enforcement approach would seem to be appropriate in certain cases.
The civil penalty action constitutes regulation of past conduct
(i.e., a permit violation) while the administrative order seeks
to regulate further conduct on the part of the violator. This
combination has already been utilized in one case, United
States v. Great Western Sugar Company,05 a wherein the defendant challenged the government's right to proceed with
both measures simultaneously. However, the case was settled
prior to any litigation on this issue.
In discussing the various enforcement options under
Section 309, it should be noted that, during a court proceeding involving any one of the foregoing enforcement actions
against a permit violator, the defendant in such proceeding
is precluded from making a collateral attack on the original
issuance of its permit. Section 509(b) (2) provides that action by the Administrator in issuing a permit under Section
402 (which is reviewable under the provisions of 509(b) (1))
shall not be subject to further judicial review in any subsequent civil or criminal proceeding for enforcement of such
permit. Thus, a permit holder who waives his right to appeal
the original issuance of his permit cannot seek to revive this
right during a subsequent enforcement proceeding brought
by the Administrator for violation of such permit.
THE

CONNECTION BAN REMEDY:

SECTION

402(h)

To assure the credibility of the municipal permit program, EPA must develop a consistent and comprehensive
response to enforcement against permit violations. Although
the Act does not make compliance by publicly owned treatment works.. directly contingent upon the availability of
federal construction grant funds, it has been administratively determined that where violation by publicly owned treatnent works exist solely because of a lack of federal funds,
initiation of an enforcement action would be inappropriate."0
108a. United States v. Great Western Sugar Company, Civil. No. C-5602 (D. Col.,
filed Dec. 21, 1973).
109. The term "treatment works" is defined in Section 212(2) (A) of the Act.
33 U.S.C. § 1292 (Supp. 1973).
110. Memorandum from John Quarles, Jr., Deputy Administrator, to EPA
Regional Administrators, December 28, 1973. The stated reason for this
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Enforcement actions may take place, however, where other
factors have contributed to the violation.
In a few cases involving violations by publicly owned
treatment works, it may be appropriate to assess civil or
criminal penalties. However, enforcement of the more significant violations should rely on the special power to impose
connection bans. This power is set forth in Section 402(h) of
the Act. It provides that, in the event the Administrator
finds that a publicly owned treatment works is violating the
terms of its N-PDES permit, he is authorized to "restrict or
prohibit" the future introduction of pollutants into such
treatment works, so long as such pollutants are not from a
source which was utilizing the treatment works prior to his
finding of a violation. Thus, the Administrator has the authority in certain situations to wholly or partially enjoin
additional sewer connections to municipal sewage treatment
facilities. Action under 402(h) may be the only feasible alternative in cases of permit violations by such facilities, since
it is highly unlikely that a court would enjoin the entire
operation of a sewage treatment plant, and in many cases
it may be financially impossible for a municipality to comply
with the terms of a mandatory injunction to expand its facilities, even with state contribution pursuant to Section 309(e).
To better understand the possible uses of connection bans
and to devise the most effective implementation techniques
for Section 402(h) actions, the EPA has studied a number of
bans enforced in recent years at the state and local levels.
Such studies illustrate that a connection ban, if effectively
implemented, can be a powerful tool for achieving environmental objectives.
The case studies show that the connection ban should not
be used as a tool to achieve a "no growth" policy within an
area. It should rather be used to achieve the goal of improved treatment capability or performance. The ban must
be designed to precipitate response directed toward the probdecision was the shortage of federal funds caused by the increase of the
federal share to 75% of construction costs pursuant to Section 202 of the
Act. However, the presidential impoundment of $9 billion of the total
congressional authorization of $18 billion undoubtedly contributed to this
decision.
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lem of inadequate treatment and not against the ban itself.
The ban should be properly publicized to inform builders and
the public of the objectives of the ban and how such objectives may be achieved. Finally, the objectives of the ban must
incorporate provisions to ensure that overloading and inadequate treatment are avoided in the future. To accomplish
this, the ban should include requirements for effective land
use planning and environmental management as well as
facility expansion.
To effectively influence local action, the ban must be
designed to gain the attention of the local community. This
requirement essentially precludes the application of the ban
at the planning and engineering stages of the construction
cycle. To apply the ban at this point would not result in
abatement of the immediate violation. Hence, a connection
ban, to have immediate impact, must be imposed so as to include projects at or near the end of the construction cycle.
Previously issued building permits should be deferred pending capacity to treat the associated waste. The case studies
show that inability to cope with issued permits has been the
principal cause of the failure of many connection bans to
date. The initial ban should include very few exceptions
for economic hardships. However, once effective action is
taken to alleviate the causes of the ban, 1 ' such exceptions
should be allowed. A court-imposed ban should include specific remedial actions, both interim and final," 2 required to
improve treatment capability and thereby achieve relaxation
or removal of the ban. It must be assumed that the municipal discharger lacked either the capability or the will to effectively manage its own affairs, or else it would not have
been the target of an enforcement action.
Other problems which must be considered in imposing
a connection ban include diversion of developers' efforts to
111. Such action may include submission and approval of facility expansion plans,
passage of a bond issue, formation of a new management agency, or passage of an effective land use ordinance.
112. Interim measures might include improved operation and maintenance procedures, minor facility modifications to improve treatment efficiency, passage and implementation of ordinances for land use management, preparation of an expansion plan, or establishment of a new management agency.
Final measures might include initiation of construction of required waste
treatment facilities or actual attainment of operational status, depending
on the threat to water quality.
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adjacent areas not subject to the ban but which are also illequipped to handle the new growth; proliferation of septic
systems within the area of the ban; proliferation of small
treatment plants constructed by the builder which serve only
the immediate development thereby ignoring regional waste
treatment management; and elimination of revenue from
sewage tap fees resulting in further local inability to meet
financial requirements associated with improvement of treatment facilities.
SECTION 311: ENFORCEMENT PROVISIONS
FOR DiSCRIARGES OF OIL AND

HAzARDous SUBSTANCES

Section 311 of the 1972 Act replaces Sections 11 and 12
of the old Federal Water Pollution Control Act," 8 which
dealt with the control of spills of oil and hazardous materials
into the navigable waters. In addition to providing the government with a wide range of enforcement options, Section
311 sets out many complex provisions concerning liabilities
and defenses of parties relative to the clean-up of spills of
oil and hazardous materials into the nation's waterways.
This article will, however, confine itself to a discussion of
the various enforcement remedies provided to the Administrator and other federal agencies.
Section 311(b) (5) is essentially a reenactment of Section
11(b) (4), although the former has been expanded to apply to
spills of both oil and hazardous materials. Section 311(b) (5)
requires that any person in charge of a vessel or of an onshore or off-shore facility from which a discharge of oil or
hazardous substances occurs shall, as soon as he has notice
of such discharge, give immediate notification of the discharge to the appropriate agency of the federal government.
Pursuant to Executive Order 11735,... the U.S. Coast Guard
has been designated the "appropriate agency" for the purpose of receiving such notices, although it is likely that the
Coast Guard will subdelegate this function to the EPA in
geographical areas which lack Coast Guard facilities. The
113. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1161, 1162 (1970).
114. 38 Fed. Reg. 21243 (1978).
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immediate notification requirement of Section 311(b) (5)
has been held not to be vague or unreasonable.1 ' While the
precise meaning of the term "immediate" has never been defined by the courts, it is likely that the cases construing similar notification requirements, such as found in the Federal
Wreck Act, 1 ' will be relied upon to a great extent. Cases
construing the aforementioned statute have held that such
a requirement does not mean literally "at once" but rather
"as soon as practicable" or "within a reasonable time in light
of the circumstances involved."".7 Section 311(b) (5) provides
for a fine of up to $10,000 and imprisonment for up to one
year for failure to give the required notification. Evidence
obtained from such notification cannot be used by the government in any subsequent criminal prosecution, including
prosecutions under statutes other than the Federal Water
Pollution Control Act."' Compliance with the notification
requirement does not however, render the discharger immune
from civil penalties under Section 311(b) (6), "" or from
prosecution under other federal statutes." 9
Section 311(b) (6) is an expanded version of old Section
11(b) (5). Section 311(b) (6) provides for assessment of
civil penalties of up to $5,000 for discharges of harmful quantities of oil and hazardous substances; it is not required that
the government, in its assessment of such penalties, establish
negligence or willfulness on the part of the discharger. This
strict liability provision differs from old Section 11(b) (5),
which applied only to "knowing" discharges. The removal
of scienter as an element of the offense has reduced the burden of proof on the agencies charged with enforcement of Section 311(b) (6), and has resulted in a great increase in the
assessment of civil penalties under the statute.
115. United States v. Refinery Corp., Criminal Action No. 72-CR-100

(Colo.

1972).

116. 83 U.S.C. § 409 (1964).
117. Petition of Anthony O'Boyle, Inc., 161 F.2d 966 (2d Cir. 1947).
118. United States v. Mobil Oil Corp., 464 F.2d 1124 (5th Cir. 1972).
118a. But see United States v. LeBeout Bros. Towing Co., Civ. Action 73-915 (E.D.
La. June 14, 1974), where the court held that 33 U.S.C. 1161 (b) (5), the
predecessor to Section 311 (b) (6), was criminal in character, notwithstanding its designation as a civil penalty and therefore could not be applied
against a discharger who had given proper notification of a spill. This
decision is presently being appealed by the Government.
119. In United States v. General American Transportation Corp., 6 ERC 1024
(D.C. N.J. 1973), the court held immunity conferred by Section 311 to be
use immunity only, and not transactional in scope.
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As was the case with old Section 11(b) (4) and (5), the
civil and criminal penalty provisions of Section 311(b) (5)
and (6) do not apply to all discharges of oil (or hazardous
materials). These subsections provide penalties only for
discharges in violation of Section 311(b) (3), which prohibits
only those discharges into the navigable waters which are in
"harmful quantities" as defined by the President pursuant
to Section 311(b) (4). The provisions of 311(b) (3) would
appear to contradict the declaration of legislative policy set
out in 311(b) (1), which states the national policy to be the
complete prohibition of all discharges of oil or hazardous substances into the navigable waters. This apparent contradiction is partially resolved, at least with regard to oil, by the
extremely broad definition of "harmful quantity" set out by
reguation in 40 C.F.R. Sections 110.3 and 110.6.1"' This definition in effect provides that, with the exception of discharges from vessel engines, any oil which is discharged in
a visually detectable amount is ipso facto a "harmful quantity." This broad definition was developed under old Section 11, but its effect is preserved under the savings clause
provision of Section 4(b) of the Act. The validity of this
administrative determination has been sustained in at least
one prosecution under Section 11(b) (4).121

Enforcement proceedings under Sections 311(b) (5) and
(6) thus far have been confined to cases involving oil spills,
since no implementing regulations have been promulgated
for hazardous substances under Section 311(b) (4).
Chief responsibility for enforcement of the civil penalty
provisions of 311(b) (6) lies with the Coast Guard, although
EPA has also been vested with extensive responsibilities in
this area. While EPA has no direct enforcement role under
311(b) (6), it does provide investigative support to the Coast
Guard in cases involving spills into the inland navigable
waters, particularly in geographical areas which lack Coast
Guard facilities. 12' The commanders of the thirteen Coast
120.
121.
122.

40 C.F.R. § 110.3 (1971).
United States v. Boyd, No. 72-2620 (9th Cir. April 18, 1973).
With the exception of two reserve units located in Denver and in Salt
Lake City, the Coast Guard has no faciilties within the six states which
comprise Region VIII of EPA: Utah, Colorado, Wyoming, North Dakota,
Montana, and South Dakota.
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Guard Districts are responsible for the assessment and collection of civil penalties. Although Section 311 (b) (6) states
that no penalty shall be assessed unless the person charged
has been given notice and opportunity for a hearing, recipients of civil penalties under this subsection do not have the
opportunity for a full adjudicatory hearing at the administrative level. Parties are simply notified of the investigation,
and upon the preliminary assessment of a civil penalty, are
notified of their right to an informal hearing before a hearing officer designated by the District Commander; a party
may also submit written objections for the hearing officer's consideration. This proceeding is the only administrative forum provided to a recipient of a civil penalty assessment; at this stage the recipient may present arguments
against the amount of the penalty, or against the basis for
its assessment. Nearly all civil penalty actions are completed
at this stage of the administrative process. If, following the
informal hearing, the Coast Guard determines not to withdraw the penalty assessment, and the recipient of the penalty
subsequently refuses to pay, the case is forwarded to the
United States Attorneys' Office for collection. It is only at
this stage that the recipient/defendant is entitled to a full
trial on the merits. The de novo proceeding at the penalty
collection stage preserves the defendant's constitutional right
to due process.'
The civil penalty procedure established under Section
311(b) (6) would appear to be a far more expeditious procedure than the aliernative measures of immediate judicial
action to collect the penalty or of granting a full adjudicatory hearing to the defendant at the administrative level.
The summary administrative procedure is, of course, aided
by the minimal statutory burden of proof imposed on the enforcing agency by Section 311(b) (6) ; the enforcing agency
need only prove that the spill occurred into navigable waters,
and that the defendant was responsible. The agency need not
prove any degree of fault on the part of the defendant. Defendants in Section 311(b) (6) actions are not rendered immune from penalty assessment by their compliance with the
123. See cases cited in 1 K. DAvis, ADMINSTRATr

LAW TREAmSR § 7.10, at 448

(1958).
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notification requirements of Section 311 (b) (5) ; however, the
Coast Guard as a matter of policy usually will not base a
civil penalty assessment solely on a discharger's notification.
Some independent evidence of the oil spill is usually required.
This policy seems to be founded more on basic notions of
fairness than on any constitutional theory of self-incrimination.
It should be noted that, once the Coast Guard has found
a party to be in violation of Section 311(b) (3), the mandatory
wording of Section 311(b) (6) requires it to assess a civil penalty. The agency cannot use its own discretion as to whether a
penalty should be assessed. Under the old FWPCA, the Coast
Guard pursued a policy of selective enforcement of the civil
penalty provisions of the predecessor of Section 311(b)
(5) ; this approach was severely criticized by the House Committee on Government Operations,1 2 4 and the Coast Guard
subsequently adopted a policy of strict enforcement. The
agency does, however, exercise discretion in determining the
size of the civil penalty to be assessed," 5 and EPA will make
recommendations as to the appropriate amount, in cases
where it is responsible for investigation of the spill.
In addition to the above-described enforcement procedure provided for spills of harmful quantities of oil and
hazardous substances, Section 311 establishes a separate penalty procedure for discharges of hazardous subtances which
have been determined to be non-removable by the Administrator. 2' Section 311(b) (2) (A) requires the Administrator to
promulgate regulations designating as hazardous substances
such elements which, when discharged into the navigable
waters in any quantity, present an imminent and substantial
danger to the public health or welfare. Once the AdminisSee the TWENTIETH REPORT BY THE COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS, H.R. REP. No. 1401, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 24-33 (1972).
125. Pus. L. No. 92-500, § 311(b) (6) (Oct. 18, 1972), provides that, in determining the amount of the penalty, the appropriateness of such penalty to
the size of the business of the owner or operator charged, the effect on the
owner or operator's ability to continue in business, and the gravity of
the violation shall be considered.
126. PUB. L. No. 92-500, § 311(a) (8) (Oct. 18, 1972) defines "remove" or "removal" as referring to "removal of the oil or hazardous substances from
the water and shorelines or the taking of such other actions as may be
necessary to minimize or mitigate damage to the public health or welfare,
including, but not limited to, fish, shellfish, wildlife, and public and private property, shorelines and beaches."
124.
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trator has made such designation, he is further required by
Section 311(b) (2) (B) to determine the extent of removability of any of the designated hazardous substances. Discharges of those substances determined not removable are
liable for civil penalties, which are assessed by the Administrator. In assessing such penalties, the Administrator is required to take into consideration the toxicity, degradability,
and dispersal characteristics of the substance."' The maximum penalty which can be imposed is $50,000, in the absence
of proof of "willful negligence" or willful misconduct on the
part of the owner or operator of the responsible facility. The
Administrator is further required by Section 311(b) (2) (D)
(iv) to establish units of measurement for the purpose of determining the amounts of such penalties; fixed monetary
amounts are then to be set for each unit. The size of the
amounts are to be based upon the toxicity, degradability, and
dispersal characteristics of the substance.
It should be noted that Section 311(b) (2) does not provide for strict liability on the part of a discharger, as is the
case with 311(b) (5). If the discharger can establish one of
the defenses to liability set out in 311(f), he can avoid assessment of the civil penalty. 2 '
Section 311(e), which is a carryover from old Section
11, provides for actions for injunctive relief whenever the
President has determined that there exists an imminent and
substantial threat to the public health and welfare because of
an actual or threatened discharge or oil or hazardous substance into or upon the navigable waters. Such actions are
brought by the appropriate U.S. Attorney's Office. The
authority for making the above-described determinations has
been delegated to both the Coast Guard and to EPA."9 The
former has such authority in cases of actual or threatened
discharges from transportation-related on-shore and off127. A determination that the hazardous substance was discharged in a harmful quantity for purposes of Sections 311(b) (3) and (4) is not required
for assessment of a civil penalty under Section 311(b) (2) (B).
128. PUB. L. No. 92-500, § 311(f) (Oct. 18, 1972) provides for the following
defenses to liability: (1) an act of God, (2) an act of war, (3) negligence
on the part of the United States Government, and (4) an act or omission
of a third party without regard to whether any such act or omission was
or was not negligent.
129. 38 Fed. Reg. 21243 (1973).
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shore facilities, while the latter has such authority in cases
involving non-transportation related facilities, both on-shore
and off-shore. The language of 311(e) would appear to authorize a broad range of remedies by the government to abate
an actual or threatened spill of oil or hazardous materials.
This broad authorization is, however, qualified by a "balancing of the equities" provision, which presumably will insure
that the detrimental effects of the required remedy will not
outweigh the seriousness of the actual or threatened discharge. 8 '
To date, only one determination of an imminent and substantial threat has been made by the Administrator. This
case... involves a large waste oil sludge pit located adjacent
to a wildlife refuge on the shore of the Great Salt Lake. The
government has filed suit for injunctive relief in U.S. District Court for Utah, and the matter is presently in litigation.
Another area in which administrative enforcement authority is divided between EPA and the Coast Guard is the
development and enforcement of rules and regulations under Section 311(j). The purpose of these regulations
is to establish procedures for removal of discharged oil and
hazardous substances, to establish criteria for development
and implementation of local and regional contingency plans
for such removal, to establish requirements to prevent spills of
oil and hazardous substances, and to establish procedures for
inspection of vessels carrying cargoes of oil and hazardous
materials. Section 311(j) (2) provides for civil penalties of
up to $5,000 for violations of such regulations, once they are
promulgated.

Pursuant to Executive Order 11735,18

the

administrative responsibility for the development of oil spill
prevention regulations, and for assessment of civil penalties
for violation of such regulations, has been divided between
EPA and the Coast Guard. The Coast Guard has been delegated responsibility for the prevention of discharges from
transportation related facilities (e.g., vessels), while EPA has
130. PuB. L. No. 92-500, § 311(e) (Oct. 18, 1972) provides that "[t]he district
courts of the United States shall have jurisdiction to grant relief as the
public interest and the equities of the case may require."
131. United States v. Union Pacific, No. NC-74-15 (D.C. Utah 1974).
132. 38 Fed. Reg. 21243 (1973).
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been delegated responsibility for non-transportation related
facilities (e.g., oil refineries).
On January 10, 1974, EPA promulgated regulations 3
requiring owners or operators of non-transportation related
facilities which, due to their location, could reasonably be
expected to discharge oil in violation of Section 311(b) (3) to
prepare and implement oil spill prevention control and countermeasure (SPCC) plans, in accordance with substantive
guidelines provided in the regulations."3 ' Such plans must be
completed within six months of the effective date of the regulations (January 10, 1974), and must be fully implemented
not later than one year from such date. SPCC plans must be
certified by a Professional Engineer, and are subject to
amendment by EPA under certain circumstances.3 5 Failure
to comply with certain provisions of the regulations renders
an owner or operator liable to a civil penalty of up to five
thousand dollars per violation." 6
The assessment of civil penalties will be handled administratively by EPA and the Coast Guard, in accordance with
the above-described allocation of responsibility. Persons
charged with a violation of the regulations are entitled to an
agency hearing on the charge prior to the assessment of a
civil penalty. In assessing a penalty under Section 311(j) (2)
the enforcing agencies are required to take into consideration
the gravity of the vioation and the demonstrated good faith
of the owner or operator in attempting to achieve rapid compliance, following its receipt of a notice of violation. The
enforcement program under Section 311(j) is similar to that
conducted under Section 311(b) (6), in that neither program
grants a full scale adjudicatory hearing to the violator at the
agency level. As in the civil penalty procedures conducted
under Section 311(b) (6), the de novo penalty collection
proceedings in U.S. District Court preserve the defendant's
constitutional right to due process. 7
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.

38
38
38
33

Fed. Reg. 34165 (1973).
Fed. Reg. 34165, at §§ 112.1(b) and 112.3(a) (1973).
Fed. Reg. 34165, at § 112.4 (1973).
U.S.C. § 1321(j) (2) (Supp. 1973) ; 38 Fed. Reg. 34165, at § 112.6 (1973).
See eupra note 123.
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It is not clear just how the foregoing enforcement provisions of Section 311, particularly the notification and civil
penalty provisions of 311(b) (5) and (6), relate to holders
of NPDES permits. The issue of how such provisions relate
to the NPDES program is likely to arise in a situation where
a permit holder is discharging oil in violation of 40 C.F.R.
Secton 110.3,'.. yet is in compliance with all effluent limitations included within its permit. Does compliance with the
permit render the holder immune from prosecution under
Section 311 . A reading of Section 402, which is the basic
authorization for the NPDES program, indicates that compliance would not render such immunity, since Section 402
makes no mention whatsoever of Section 311; for example,
Section 402(k) provides that compliance with a permit "shall
be deemed compliance, for purposes of Section 309 and 505,
with Sections 301, 302, 306, 307, and 403.... " Thus, it would
seem that compliance with a NPDES permit is not ipso
facto compliance with Section 311. In addition, the definition of discharge provided in Section 311 clearly covers those
types of discharges within the purview of Section 402 (despite the fact that the clean-up and prevention provisions of
Section 311 appear to be designed for spills, rather than continuous discharges).' 3 9 The Conference Report on the bill
simply states that Section 311 does not apply to those discharges of oil which are not in harmful quantities, and are
pursuant to, and not in violation of, NPDES permits. 4 0 The
Conference Report statement really does nothing to clarify
the problem, since a discharge of oil not in a harmful quantity
is never in violation of Section 311, regardless of whether
or not such discharge is pursuant to a NPDES permit.
138. 40 C.F.R. § 110.3 (1971).
139. PUB. L. No. 92-500, § 311(a) (2) (Oct. 18, 1972) defines "discharge" as
including, but not limited to, "[a]ny spilling, leaking, pumping, pouring,
emitting, emptying or dumping . . . ." The definition of "discharge" for
purposes of Section 402 is given in Sections 502(12) and (16). Section
502(16) defines "discharge" as a discharge of a pollutant; the "discharge
of a pollutant" is defined by Section 502 (12) as "(A) any addition of any
pollutant to navigable waters from any point source, (B) any addition of
any pollutant to the waters of the contiguous zone or the ocean from any
point source other than a vessel or other floating craft." The terms "pollutant" and "point source" are defined by Sections 502(6) and (14),
respectively.
140. SENATE CONFzRENCB REPORT No. 1236, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 134 (1972).
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At present, NPDES permits issued by EPA contain a
clause stating that the permit does not preclude the holder
from any responsibilities, liabilities, or penalties to which
the holder is or may be subject to under Section 311.14' This
approach is consistent with the Coast Guard's position that
it will take action against violations of Section 311 whether
or not NPDES permits are involved.'42 It is likely that the
above-described permit clause will be challenged by a permit
applicant in the near future.
EMERGENCY PoWERS OF THE ADMINISTRATOR
UNDER SECTION

504

In addition to the broad enforcement powers conferred
on him by Sections 309, 311, and 402, the Administrator is
vested with certain emergency powers under Section 504.
This section provides that, upon receipt of evidence that a
pollution source is presenting an imminent and substantial
endangerment to the health and economic welfare of persons,
he may request the Justice Department to bring suit in the
appropriate U.S. District Court to immediately enjoin the
discharges of pollutants from such sources. However, use
of this section will probably be restricted to drastic situations.
A similar provision in the Clean Air Act 4 ' has been invoked
only once since passage of the Act in 1970."' It is likely that
the emergency provisions of Section 504 will be utilized as a
supplement to the general regulatory program provided in
other sections of the Act. The provisions of Section 504
would appear to be particularly effective in situations where
a discharge from a facility in compliance with its NPDES
permit was for some reason causing an imminent and substantial threat to the environment. The language of both Sections
402(k) and 504 makes it clear that compliance with a
141. Memorandum from EPA's Office of Enforcement and General Counsel to
the Permit Program Chiefs of all EPA regional offices, September 18,
1973.
142. Information transmitted to the authors by Commander G. H. Dickman,
Chief, Marine Environmental Protection Branch, Twelfth U.S. Coast Guard
District by memorandum dated September 5, 1973.
143. 42 U.S.C. § 1857h-1 (1970).
144. Such action was taken in response to a severe air pollution problem in
Birmingham, Ala. on or about November 17, 1971, United States v. United
States Steel, No. 71-1041 (N.D. Ala. November 18, 1971).
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NPDES permit is no defense to injunctive action action by
the Administrator pursuant to Section 504.'4'
RELATIONSHIP OF THE REFUSE ACT TO
ENFORCEMENT UNDER THE FWPCA

The application of the immunity provision of Section
402 (k) 46 to enforcement actions under the Refuse Act clearly
indicates that Congress intended that the Refuse Act continue
to exist as a viable enforcement tool outside the scope of such
immunity provisions. The legislative history of the 1972
Act strongly supports this view.' 47 In addition, Section 511
(a) specifically preserves the Secretary of the Army's authority under the River and Harbor Act of 1899, of which the
Refuse Act is a part.
It is clear from the foregoing provisions of the Act that
the effectiveness of the Refuse Act as an enforcement tool
is preserved. However, it is the policy of EPA to rely mainly
on the enforcement provisions of the FW-PCA, and restrict
the initiation of actions under the Refuse Act to those cases
which do not fall within the purview of Section 309.148 Three
areas in which the Refuse Act will continue to be utilized are
cases involving instantaneous or short-term discharges, such
as oil spills, cases involving discharges from sources which
fall outside the Act's definition of point sources, 4 ' and cases
involving solid waste deposits into the navigable waters,
where EPA has determined that the permit provisions of
Section 402 are not applicable because of the short duration
of the particular discharge or deposit.
Section 504 is not included within the immunity provision of Section 402 (k).
PUB. L. No. 92-500, § 902(k) (Oct. 18, 1972) provides that "[u]ntil December 31, 1974, in any case where a permit has been applied for ... but final
administrative disposition of such application has not been made, such
discharge shall not be a violation of (1) Sections 301, 306, or 402 of this
Act, of (2) Section 13 of the Act of March 3, 1899."
147. S. REP. No. 414, 92d Cong., Ist Sess. 64 (1972):
Federal Government is not constrained in any way from acting
against violators .... The Administrator retains, without qualification, the authority presently available under the Refuse Act to
prosecute for unlawful discharges.
148. Memorandum from EPA Office of Enforcement and General Counsel, to
Regional Enforcement Directors, January 24, 1973.
149. See p. 14 infra.
145.
146.
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CITIZEN SUITS
Patterned after the provision for citizen suits contained
in the Clean Air Act of 1970,1"' Section 505 of the Act establishes the right of citizen participation in the enforcement
of control requirements and regulations created under the
Act.' Section 505 authorizes citizens to bring civil actions
against any person, including the United States and any other
governmental agency, alleged to be in violation of an effluent
standard or limitation or an order issued by the EPA or a
state with respect to such standards or limitations." 2 Because the Act authorizes citizen action specifically in the
above circumstances, the result of any citizen enforcement
action should be the same as if the enforcement action were
taken by EPA. In either case, the issue should be the same,
namely whether a violation took place concerning an effluent
standard or limitation or order issued by the EPA or a state
with respect to such standards or limitations. Further, by
specifically stating the circumstances under which a citizen
may take action, the Act provides a concrete standard for
the court in resolving the case. It must be noted that since
citizen action may only be taken against a violator under
505(a), equitable actions to prohibit possible violations are
not contemplated by the Act. Inasmuch as all effluent data,
records and other information obtained under the Act must
be available to the public,"' many evidentiary problems encountered in early citizen lawsuits should be avoided. In
the past, the only way to obtain such information, if it existed
at all, was to engage in time-consuming and costly discovery
procedure.
In addition to authorizing citizen suits under the above
circumstances, the Act authorizes actions against the Administrator of EPA for alleged failure to perform duties mandated by the Act."' This provision expanded the scope of
citizen action in the administrative process, mainly by clarifying the issues of standing and jurisdiction. Previously, a
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.

42
33
33
33
33

U.S.C.
U.S.C.
U.S.C.
U.S.C.
U.S.C.

§
§
§
§
§

1857h-2 (1971).
1365 (Supp. 1973).
1365(a)(1) (Supp. 1973).
1318 (Supp. 1973).
1365(a)(2) (Supp. 1973).
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citizen had to rely on agency action and then could only take
court action by appealing the agency's action on the grounds
that the agency abused its authority or that it violated explicit statutory language. The Act provides a statutory basis
which authorizes a citizen to take immediate action against
the agency. Thereby, a citizen may sue to compel the Administrator to take action where none was contemplated, or to
challenge action which the Administrator is taking.
The district courts are given jurisdiction over citizen
suits notwithstanding the amount in controversy or the citizenship of the parties. 5 However, action involving a violation of an effluent standard or limitation or an order involving such standard or limitation must be brought in the judicial district in which the discharge source is located. 5 '
Prior to commencing any action, the plaintiff must provide the alleged violator, the state and the Administrator
with 60 days' notice of the alleged violation.15 ' Where violations of new source performance standards and toxic standards are concerned, the notice requirement does not apply.5 8
The obvious purpose of the notice requirement is to allow the
violator, the state, or the Administrator to take abatement
measures. In so providing, Congress left no doubt that it
intended that EPA and the states have primary enforcement
responsibility. Only where such responsibility was not properly carried out would citizen action be allowed. EPA has
promugated regulations concerning "Prior Notice of Citizen
Suits. '159
If, after notice, no diligent action is taken against the
violator by either the state or EPA, the plaintiff would undoubtedly choose to file the action. However, if the state or
Administrator commences action subsequent to the citizen's
notice, the options of the citizen under the Act are not clear.
Subsection 505(b) (1) (B) provides:
155:
156.
157.
158.
159.

33
33
33
33
38

U.S.C. § 1365(a) (Supp. 1973).
(Supp. 1973).
U.S.C. § 1365( )(1)
U.S.C. § 1365(b) (Supp. 1973).
U.S.C. § 1365(b) (Supp. 1973).
Fed. Reg. 15040 (1973).
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No action may be commenced... if the Administrator or State has commenced and is diligently prosecuting a civil or criminal action in a court of the
United States, or a state to require compliance with
the standard, limitation, or order, but in any such
action in any court of the United States any citizen
may intervene as a mater of right.
This subsection could be read to preclude a separate
citizen action where a state or the Administrator had initiated
action subsequent to receipt of the citizen's notice of violation. This reading would allow the citizen only the alternative of intervention in such action in a court of the United
States as a matter of right. This may give the citizen some
input where a suit was initiated by the Administrator but
leaves him no recourse where a state has commenced an action
in a state court. This interpretation assumes that state courts
are not included within the term "a court of the United
States."
The other possible interpretation of Subsection 505(b)
(1) (B) is that if the citizen is not satisfied with the action
taken by either the state or the Administrator, he should be
allowed to pursue his suit. Under such circumstances, the
court would have to consider the suit in light of the agency
action and could then determine that such action was adequate to justify suspension, dismissal, or consolidation of the
citizen petition. If the court decided the agency action was
inadequate, it could consider the citizen action notwithstanding any pending agency action.
Of the two possible interpretations, the second would
seem more reasonable. However, a simple reading of Subsection 505(b) (1) (B) seems to indicate that the first interpretation was intended. The legislative history concerning this
subsection is of no help inasmuch as the comments of the
Senate Committee on Public Works support the second interpretation1 6 ° and the Joint Explanatory Statement of the
Committee on Conference supports the first interpretation. 16 '
Another question raised by Section 505(b) (1) (B), but
left unanswered, is whether or not a citizen may intervene in
160. S. REP. No. 414, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 79 (1971).
161. S. REP. No. 1236, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 145 (1972).
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a suit initiated by the Administrator or a state in a court of
the United States prior to receipt of the citizen's notice of
violation. Resolution of this issue is important where the
Administrator or state is pursuing a course of action which
the citizen may not agree with. For instance, the Administrator or the state may only be pursuing equitable remedies
to stop the violation and may not be seeking penalties for
past violations.
The Act provides that in addition to assessing civil penalties against the violator, the court may award costs of litigation, including reasonable attorney and expert witness fees,
to any party.1 62 In discussing this provision, the Senate Committee on Public Works recognized its potential value for
all parties concerned.' 6 Inasmuch as it could be applied
against the plaintiffs where litigation is frivolous or harassing, it should have the effect of discouraging abuse of the
citizen suit provision. On the other hand, the Committee
stated:
The Courts should recognize that in bringing
legitimate actions under this section citizens would
be performing a public service and in such instances,
the courts should award costs of litigation to such
party. This should extend to plaintiffs in actions
which result in successful abatement but do not reach
a verdict. For instance, if as a result of a citizen
proceeding and before a verdict is issued, a defendant abated a violation, the court may award litigation expenses borne by the plaintiffs in prosecuting
such actions.'
It should be noted that the statute does not require a party
to prevail as a prerequisite to awarding attorney fees. In
Sierra Club v. Lynn,1 65 although the plaintiffs failed to prevail, the court recognized that they performed a valuable
162. 33 U.S.C. § 1365(d) (Supp. 1973) ; see NRDC v. EPA, 5 ERC 1891 (1st Cir.
1973), in which the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 1st Circuit assessed
attorneys' fees against EPA in a suit not specifically arising under the
Citizen Suit provision of the Clean Air Act.
163. See supra note 160.
164. Id. at 81.
165. 5 ERC 1745 (W.D. Tex. 1973). Concerning awards of counsel fees in general, see La Raza Unida v. Volpe, 57 FRD 94, 4 ERC 1797 (N.D. Cal. 1972) ;
Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe v. Morton, 360 F. Supp. 669 (D.D.C. 1973);
U.S. _-, 93 S.Ct. 1943 (1973); Colorado Public InHall v. Cole, __
(Colo. 1974).
terest Research Group v. Train, ____ F. Supp. __
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service for the public in bringing the suit and consequently
awarded attorneys' fees to the losing party.
Section 505(d) further provides that if a temporary restraining order or preliminary injunction is sought, the court
may require the filing of a bond or equivalent security in
accordance with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The
Federal Rules anticipate that the plaintiff will be required
by the court to post sufficient security to cover the damages
incurred by the defendant during the term of any wrongfully
granted injunction.166 This rule is fair where both parties are
pursuing private interests. However, in environmental cases,
a citizen sues as a private attorney general to protect the
public as well as himself. A further distinction in suits for
equitable relief brought under the Act is that the citizen is
not merely attempting to enjoin damaging action, but criminal conduct as well.' 67 Hence, the traditional method of computing the amount of security does not lend itself to suits of
this type. To conclude otherwise would in effect deny citizens the right to equitable relief under the Act and would be
tantamount to taking away with one hand what was given
with the other. Courts have recognized the uniqueness of
environmental suits where posting bond for security is concerned and have held that no more than a nominal bond
should be required of plaintiffs who are acting as private
attorneys general.' 8 It must be borne in mind, however, that
failure to require any security where security is required by
law is error and may constitute grounds for reversal."6 9
Generally, issuance of a preliminary injunction rests in
the discretion of the trial court.' 70 However, the following
four factors are usually taken into consideration by courts
in determining whether a preliminary injunction should be
issued:
166. FED. R. Civ. P. 65 (c).
167. See 33 U.S.C. § 1319 (Supp. 1973).
168. West Virginia Highlands Conservancy v. Island Creek Coal Co., 441 F.2d
232 (4th Cir. 1971); NRDC v. Morton, 337 F. Supp. 167 (D.D.C. 1971);
EDF v. Corps of Engineers, 331 F. Supp. 925 (D.D.C. 1971); NRDC v.
Grant, 4 ERC 1657 (1972) and 4 ERC 1659 (1972).
169. Telex Corp. v. Int'l. Business Machine Corp., 464 F.2d 1025 (8th Cir. 1972);
Pioche Mines Consol., Inc. v. Dolman, 333 F.2d 257, 273-74 (9th Cir. 1964),
cert. denied, 380 U.S. 956 (1964).
170. Crowther v. Seaborg, 415 F.2d 437 (10th Cir. 1969).
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1)

Whether the plaintiff will suffer immediate and
irreparable harm ;171

2)

Whether the harm to the plaintiff outweighs the
injury to the defendant by granting the injunction ;172

3)

Whether the plaintiff is likely to succeed on the
merits ;1.

4)

The public interest.

7"

Meeting factors 1) and 3) should be facilitated by the
requirement of the Act that all effluent data, reports and
It has
other information must be available to the public.'
been held that when the acts sought to be enjoined have been
declared unlawful or clearly against the public interest,
plaintiff need not show irreparable harm, 7 ' nor a balance
of hardship in his favor."'I
"Citizen" for the purposes of the citizen suit section is
defined as a "person or persons having an interest which is
The definition was based
or may be adversely affected.'..
on Section 10 of the Administrative Procedure Act," 9 and
the interpretation given to that section in Sierra Club v.
Morton."80 In that case the Supreme Court held that under
the Administrative Procedure Act a person has standing
to seek judicial review only if he can show that he himself
has suffered or will suffer injury by the action or inaction
complained of. The Court referred to its decision in Data
Processing Service v. Camp' and held that non-economic
injury to an environmental interest is sufficient to meet the
announced test, stating that "the interest alleged to have been
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.

United States Steel v. Fri, 364 F. Supp. 1013 (N.D. Ind. 1973); Citizens
Ass'n. v. Washington, 6 ERC 1166 (D.D.C. 1974).
Sierra Club v. Hickel, 433 F.2d 24 (9th Cir. 1970); Sierra Club v. Resor,
329 F. Supp. 890 (D.C. Wis. 1971).
Supra note 171.
United States Steel v. Fri, 364 F. Supp. 1013 (N.D. Ind. 1973); EDF v.
TVA, 339 F. Supp. 806 (E.D. Tenn. 1972).
33 U.S.C. § 1318 (Supp. 1973).
United States v. Hayes Int'l Corp., 415 F.2d 1038 (5th Cir. 1969); S.E.C.
v. Globus Intl, Ltd., 320 F. Supp. 158 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 103 F. Supp. 569, 576 (D.D.C.
1952), aff'd, 343 U.S. 579 (1952); Annot., 26 A.L.R.2d 1378 (1952).
33 U.S.C. § 1365(g) (Supp. 1973).
5 U.S.C. § 702 (1967).
405 U.S. 727 (1972).
397 U.S. 150 (1970).
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injured 'may reflect' aesthetic, conservational, and recreational 'as well as economic values.' ,,' The Court also emphasized that:
[a]esthetic and environmental well-being, like economic well-being, are important ingredients of the
quality of life in our country, and the fact that
particular environmental interests are shared by the
many rather than the few does not make them less
deserving of legal protection through the judicial
process. 8
Thus, a party's or organization's mere concern or expertise
with a problem, no matter how long standing the concern and
no matter how qualified they may be in evaluating the problem, is not sufficient by itself to meet the test of being adversely affected.
CONCLUSION

Although the Federal Water Pollution Control Act
Amendments of 1972 are well into their second year of existence, it is still too early to predict whether they will achieve
the stated objective of restoring and maintaining the integrity
of the nation's waters. The efforts of the Environmental Protection Agency during the last two years have largely been
devoted toward implementation of the Act. Such efforts include issuance of discharge permits, awarding grants for
the construction of municipal waste water treatment works,
planning and monitoring, and setting effluent standards for
various industries. Activities such as these must be done to
provide a sound foundation prior to moving from the imple-

mentation stage to the enforcement stage of the Act. One
implemetantion effort which has had particularly disappointing results has been delegation of the INPDES discharge permit program to the states. In the first eighteen months of the
Act only six states have qualified for delegation.' This circumstance has severely taxed the resources of the EPA in that
182. 405 U.S. 727, 738 (1972).
183. 405 U.S. 727, 734 (1972). See also United States v. SCRAP, 5 ERC 1449
(1973) in which the U.S. Supreme Court made it clear that it did not intend to back off from its opinion in Sierra Club.
184. California, Michigan, Oregon, Connecticut, Washington and Wisconsin.
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it has received approximately 65,000 permit applications to be
processed. Because of this resource drain, it has been difficult
to maintain a vigorous enforcement policy. Hopefully more
states will qualify to issue and enforce permits in the near future. Whether or not the hoped for decentralization occurs,
EPA should place high priority in the immediate future on enforcement against major violators and against persons who
fail to file for a discharge permit.
The successful implementation of the numerous and complex provisions of the Act is heavily dependent upon voluntary compliance by the affected industries and municipalities.
The strongest possible incentive for voluntary compliance is
a vigorous enforcement program. The Act clearly gives
EPA the tools to conduct an effective enforcement program.
It is up to EPA to put them to good use. Failure to do so
will undermine achievement of the goal of no discharge by
1985.
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